US Wreck on the Baghdad Road, 2003.
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Analysis Iraq |
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US Wreck on the Baghdad Road, 2003. |
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Wildcards of Iraq Options and Operations Jim Bartlett March
7th, 2003 There are few military observers who believe that the act of invading Iraq itself would pose much of a problem. Her military is in a shambles and her people economically ruined. Conventional defense to any degree that would impede U.S. forces is really not an option. But what of the weeks and months of occupation to come? That poses a much trickier proposition and that factor has received far less attention than the run up to war. Despite it’s economic condition, Iraq is still a very large nation with a varied and difficult terrain. It is also host to a hodge-podge of faiths, tribal clans and checkered political landscapes. It is also a nation surrounded by several less than friendly nations with a history of sponsoring or harboring terrorists, namely Iran and Syria. While the opening hand will no doubt be a flush and fold affair, the rest of the game could very well see less than a perfect draw. Enter the “Wildcards.”
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The Stage Then there are the Shiite and Sunni Muslims who have been known to disagree violently over all things Islamic. Add to the mix the Middle Eastern terrorist networks that could infiltrate what would undoubtedly be a much more loosely controlled country. For many of them, the chance to take a crack at Yankees in scattered outposts would be too tempting to pass up. Taken together, it is a volatile mix that will require maximum effort, maximum commitment and every bit of experience the US has had since Crook rode into Arizona and Dewey entered Manila Bay. |
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The Tigris and Euphrates Basin;
Enemy #1 Despite major drainage efforts in the south during the nineties by Saddam, there remain plenty of dams to burst, bridges to blow and constricted road nets to mine or ambush. While it is expected that most of the people in this area will welcome US troops as liberators, it only takes a handful of die-hards, with conveniently stashed small arms and demo, to raise quite a ruckus. With a logistics tail that will eventually stretch over 1000 kilometers from the docks at Basra to the north, they will have ample opportunities to strike.
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Unreconstructed Saddamites Even uglier scenes could erupt as old scores are settled. An Iraqi constabulary under U.S. command could go a long way towards flushing out the hostiles. This is not a mission conventional military thinkers in the Pentagon have given much attention to, however. Senior officers have spent most of their careers focusing on the Soviet threat in Europe. It remains to be seen if senior Pentagon officers can achieve the flexibility necessary to contain such an insurgency or even the general social unrest that will surely follow the implosion of Hussein's government. |
| Middle East Terrorists Find a Happy Hunting Ground
Add to this mix largely undetectable and even more violent Islamic extremist movements already flocking to the region and the stage could be set for
daily American casualties. In the absence of an Iraqi border police
capable of effective interdiction, infiltration by such groups will go
largely unchecked. Refugees from the area they now control report that they sell posters of Osama Bi-Laden in the market and have openly talked of sending suicide bombers against the Americans and British. If they descend after the Americans have secured Baghdad and blend in with sympathetic elements, they will be very difficult to root out. At the end of the day, Ansar is only one of a kaleidoscope of terrorist groups eager to kill Americans.
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| Air Power Has it's Limits Much stock has been placed in US airpower. It allegedly worked wonders during the first Gulf War and has improved technologically since then. What US commanders have failed to take into account is both the weather and guerilla action. Problems with sandstorms and clouds of small arms fire from the villages will undoubtedly expose critical shortcomings in the American ability to put up helicopter forces. This hampers the ability to engage in the pinpoint targeting necessary for hitting small clusters of light infantry hiding out in villages and marshland. As America saw in Vietnam, it is almost impossible for fixed wing aircraft to engage these small units effectively. While these groups may not have a major impact on large front line units, they are quite capable of shooting up truck convoys along the 800 mile supply line to Baghdad. Whether the rear can ever be completely cleared remains to be seen. Images of dead US soldiers being picked off nickel and dime on CNN is not something the Bush administration can afford. Likewise, images of dead Iraqi civilians killed in attempts to use airpower against small groups of ambushers is not tolerable either. As history has proven, at some point the little man always finds a way to get around the big man's big stick. |
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| The Long Haul
That America intends to step fully into the power vacuum created by the disposal of Saddam is probably the lesser of several evil. This will take place, however, in a country that has been economically destroyed, where one clan has been played against another for decades and across a landscape that will be difficult if not impossible to fully police with U.S. troops. Add to that unfriendly regional players hostile to a U.S. presence in the region and it will indeed be a long and tricky occupation.
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All contents copyright Jim Bartlett 2006 |
